Mind, Soul, Language in Wittgenstein Essay examples -- Philosophy Phil

Mind, Soul, Language in WittgensteinABSTRACT I show that the latter Wittgensteins interposition of language and the mind results in a conception of the human case that goes against the exclusive emphasis on the cognitive that characterizes our modern conception of noesis and the self. For Wittgenstein, our identification with the cognitive ego is tantamount to a blindness to our avow nature blindness that is entrenched in our present culture. The task of school of thought is thus transformed into a form of cultural therapy that seeks to awaken in us a sensitivity to different modes of aw beness than the merely intellectual. Its warmheartedness of reflection becomes not only the field of conscious rational thought, further the tension in our nature amongst reason and vital feeling, that is, between culture and conduct. It is well known that Wittgenstein is responsible for two smashing moments in the philosophy of this century the first initially and incorrectly identified w ith tenacious positivism, and the second even now considered as paradigm of Analytic philosophy. as yet as identifications, both interpretations seem to me to show an imperfect and only incomplete understanding of Wittgensteins philosophical motivations, alone I do not reckon to discuss that point on this opportunity. What is important to our present purposes is that what separates his two great works is his discovery of a kind of intellectual blindness produced by the almost exclusive predominance of one single conception of intimacy or rationality in our culture.The first signs of this philosophical shift are found in Wittgensteins observations not specifically about language but rather about ritual practices, as they were considered in The Golden Bough. In his opini... ...of devotion their incessant, inevitable and essential tension.Notes(1) Remarks on The Golden Bough, (OF), p. 58.(2) OF, p. 73 cf Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, II, 39-40, pp. 84-5.(3) OF, p. 7 8.(4) OF, p. 83.(5) All these attempts announce what Wittgenstein will call our form of life.(6) Cf. Philosophical Investigations II, iv.(7) This example is derived form Stanley Cavells discussions in Aesthetic Problems of sophisticated philosophical system in Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge University Press, 1969.(8) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, v.1, 313(9) Cf. Marcia Cavell The Psychoanalytic Mind From Freud to Philosophy, Harvad University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 102.(10) Csar Vallejo, in El arte y la revolucin, Lima, Mosca Azul Editores, 1973, p. 70(11) Cf. Philosophical Investigations, II, xii